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DEFAMATION AND RADIO
DONALD G. GRAHAM*
Out of man's instinct to hurt his fellow man was born slander.
With the advent of the printing press, one's reputation became
subject to a more vicious attack because more enduring, and be-
cause of the larger audience. Written or printed defamation be-
came libel.' The difference is important, for an action for libel
will lie without proof of actual loss, i. e., the loss of some material
advantage which is either pecuniary or capable of being measured
in money. An action for slander, on the other hand, does not
usually lie unless special damage can be proved. The reason usu-
ally advanced for this distinction between libel and slander is
that a greater degree of harm is possible in the case of a libel than
in the case of a slander, owing to the more durable publicity of
libel and the fact that it is more easily disseminated. 2
Radio has opened up a new and larger opportunity for defama-
tion than has ever existed before. There are licensed today in the
United States 683 broadcasting stations scattered throughout the
country.3 Newspapers are fairly closely owned and do not open
their columns generally to the public. Radio stations, on the other
hand, broadcast the message not only of those who lease their
facilities, but they also carry the messages of men of public af-
fairs and public officials, for which unsponsored broadcasting they
receive no commercial return. Speeches of a timely and informa-
tive nature delivered before an audience are frequntly broadcast
with a microphone before the speaker, and these, in turn, are
received by thousands of radio listeners in addition to the audience
which is seated before the speaker. Modern invention has thus
arisen as an ally of defamation, and if man's ingenuity continues
at its present rate, the vehicles for libel and slander will continue
to increase. Television will certainly not lessen the effectiveness
of a defamatory imputation.
Program content to the operator of a radio broadcasting sta-
tion is a real and constant problem. His license must be renewed
each six months and in determining whether he shall retain his
*Of the Seattle Bar.
'Libel has been held to include:
(a) Pictures, Peck v. Tribune Publishing Co., 214 U. S. 185, 29 Sup.
Ct. 554, 53 L. Ed. 960 (1908).
(b) Motion pictures, Merle v. Sociological Research Film Corporation,
166 App. Div. 376, 152 N. Y. S. 829 (1915).
(c) Conduct consisting of shadowing, Schultz v. Frankfort Marine
Ins. Co., 151 Wis. 537, 139 N. W. 386 (1913).
2COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS (4th Ed.) § 144.
3As of January 1, 1936 the Joint Committee on Radio Research esti-
mated that of the total population of the United States, amounting to
128,429,000, there were 22,869,000 radio families.
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license or whether the station shall be deleted, the Federal Com-
munications Commission is required to determine whether the
licensee has served public interest, convenience and necessity.4 In
serving public interest, educational programs have assumed a large
importance. It is recognized that it is not sufficient to have only
amused and entertained the listeners. They should be educated
and informed and conscientious broadcast station operators are
constantly striving to raise the cultural level of their programs.
Providing the station operator stays clear of copyright entangle-
ments, his legal difficulties will be few so long as the programs are
confined to pure entertainment or education. As soon, however,
as programs take on a controversial content, his troubles begin.
A torrid political campaign is being waged in the city where
the broadcast station is located. The most effective way of reaching
the largest number of voters is over the air. Should the station
owner permit the candidates and their representatives to campaign
over the radio? If he permits one candidate to speak, he is pro-
hibited under the Communications Act from denying the facili-
ties to other candidates. Furthermore, he is not permitted to
censor political speeches-at least, if they are delivered by a candi-
date personally.' Stations with a larger listening audience have,
to date, considered that they are serving public interest by carry-
ing political speeches. This type of program, however, has proved
to be the most fruitful source of defamatory utterance. Fair and
honest comment or criticism is permissible, but when directed at
individuals it is difficult, as a practical matter, to determine
whether such comment has crossed the border line and has become
defamation.
In the field of controversy another type of program. is even
more dangerous as to possible defamatory utterance. A strike
is on, involving a commodity or service in which the public of
that community is interested. Broadcast stations are called upon
to broadcast programs of one side or the other, or both. Such pro-
grams usually involve, in addition to comments on the issues, more
or less direct and inflammatory criticism' of individuals. If the
station operator allows his facilities to be used for programs of
'Sec. 307, Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1083.
r"If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified
candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall
afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office
in the use of such broadcasting station, and the Commission shall make
rules and regulations to carry this provision into effect: Provided, That
such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broad-
cast under the provisions of this section. No obligation is hereby imposed
upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate."
Sec. 315, Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1085.
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this character he is, in effect, gambling that the people criticised
will not deem themselves defamed and institute an action for libel.
A labor leader may become extremely touchy when adversely crit-
icised.
The danger of civil suit for libel and the possibility of having
assessed against him a heavy verdict for damages is not the only
worry of a broadcasting station operator. Possibly one, or a few
suits against him for libel, would not jeopardize his license but
it is probable that the Communications Commission would deter-
mine that he is not serving public interest if he so operates his
station as to become frequently embroiled in libel proceedings.
The discussion thus far has assumed that a broadcasting station
is liable to defamatory comment made over its facilities along
with the speaker. The few cases thus far decided so hold. The
law cannot be said to have become settled on this point, and it is
the purpose of this discussion to consider whether radio broadcast-
ing should have applied to it the long established rules and dis-
tinctions of the law of defamation, or whether the service that
radio broadcasting is required to render justifies some reappraise-
ment and modificatiton of this law as applied to it.
Only three cases of importance in this country have dealt di-
rectly with defamation by radio. In the first case, Sorenson v.
Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82, decided in 1932, the Supreme
Court of Nebraska held that the station licensee was liable for
defamatory words broadcast over its station. The decision was
appealed to the United States Supreme Court but was dismissed
there because the judgment of the State Court was based on a
non-federal ground adequate to support it. W. M. Stebbins was
a Republican candidate for nomination to the United States Sen-
ate. Station KFAB, having extended its facilities to Senator
Norris, who was a candidate for the same office, granted broad-
casting time to Stebbins. Richard F. Wood spoke on behalf of
Stebbins and read his radio address from prepared copy, during
the course of which he used defamatory language against the
plaintiff Sorenson, who was a candidate for reelection as Attorney
General. The station contended that it was legally required to
afford access of its facilities to Stebbins and that under the Fed-
eral statute it could not censor the material to be broadcast. This
contention was answered by the court in the following language:
"We do not think Congress intended by this language
in the radio act to authorize or sanction the publication
of libel and thus to raise an issue with the federal con-
stitutional provisions prohibiting the taking of property
without due process or without payment of just com-
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pensation. Const. Fifth Amendment. This is particularly
true where any argument for exercise of the police power
and for any public benefit to be derived would seem. to be
against such an interpretation rather than to be served
by it. So far as we can discover, no court has adjudi-
cated this phase of the statute and order. We reject the
theory. For the purposes of this case we adopt an inter-
pretation that seems in accord with the intent of Con-
gress and of the radio commission. We are of the opinion
that the prohibition of censorship of material broadcast
over the radio station of a licensee merely prevents the
licensee from censoring the words as to their political and
partisan trend but does not give a licensee any privilege
to join and assist in the publication of a libel nor grant
any immunity from the consequences of such action. The
federal radio act confers no privilege to broadcasting sta-
tions to publish defamatory utterances."
The court, by implication, held that the language was libel rather
than slander, for the reason that the speaker read his speech from
written continuity; further, that the station licensee was abso-
lutely liable along with the speaker.
The next case, decided in point of time, was Miles v. Louis
Wasmer, Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 26 P. (2d) 847, decided in 1933.
One Castner purchased broadcasting time from radio station
KHQ, licensed to. Louis Wasmer, Inc.,_ in Spokane, Washington.
Castner employed Lantry, a program announcer employed by the
station, to edit Castner's speech and read it over KHQ. This was
to be done during hours other than those spent by Lantry in his
station employment. The program, so arranged and sponsored,
was broadcast, during the course of which words defamatory of
the county sheriff, E. E. Miles, were uttered. The court held that
it was not necessary to determine whether the words were slander-
ous or libelous although it was stated:
"There is a close analogy between the words spoken
over a broadcasting station and libelous words contained
in a paid advertisement in a newspaper."
The Sorenson case was quoted at length, and the station licensee
was held absolutely liable along with the speaker.
The next case was Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Company, 8
Fed. Supp. 889, decided by Federal District Judge Otis of Mis-
souri, in 1934. Station KMBC, licensed to the defendant in Kansas
City, fissouri, was the outlet there for the Columbia Broadcast-
ing Company which regularly sent programs to it by telephone
from New York. Included among these was one sponsored by
Remington-Rand, Inc., during the course of which references were
made to Robert J. Coffey, a police official of Kansas City. The
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words complained of required less than three seconds for utter-
ance. He sued three corporations, namely, the licensee, Columbia
Broadcasting Company and Remington-Rand, Inc., in the State
Court. A non-resident defendant removed the case to the Federal
Court on the ground of separability of causes. The plaintiff moved
to remand the cause to the State Court, which motion was granted,
and the case was finally disposed of in the State Court. The
words were spoken into the Columbia Broadcasting Company's
microphone in New York by an employee of Remington-Rand,
were transmitted by telephone to the control room of KIIBC and
from there they were broadcast by 1 1BC. The employees of
KMBC who were in charge of its operation had no knowledge that
any defamatory words would be included in the program and no
means of interrupting them after they began to be spoken. The
court held the station absolutely liable, and stated:
"In my thought, then, I put the primary offender in
the local studio of KMBC at Kansas City. I assume his
good reputation; I assume that nothing in any former
performance by him should put the owner of the station
on inquiry; I assume even that he has submitted a manu-
script and that nothing in it is questionable; I assume
a. sudden utterance by him of defamatory words not in-
cluded in the manuscript, an utterance so quickly made
as to render impossible its prevention; I assume, in short,
a complete absence of the slightest negligence on the
part of the owner of the station. With those assumptions
is the owner of KMBC liable to one of whom the primary
offender has falsely spoken as an ex-convict who has
served time in a penitentiary? The conclusion seems in-
escapable that the owner of the station is liable."
It was further stated, as to the comparison with a newspaper
publication:
"The latter (newspaper publisher) prints the libel
on paper and broadcasts it to the reading world. The
owner of the radio station 'prints' the libel on a differ-
ent medium just as widely or even more widely 'read'.
* ' * The owner of a broadcasting station knows that
some time some one may misuse his station to libel
another. He takes that risk."
It is thus seen that the only three cases dealing with defama-
tion over the radio, specifically hold the station operator liable
along with the speaker, notwithstanding the fact that the speaker
is not the agent or employee of the station licensee; further, that
defamation by radio constitutes libel rather than slander.
The question of the liability of a radio station for defamation
has had a checkered course in the Council deliberations of the
American Law Institute in reference to the Restatement of the
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Law of Torts. The draft as originally submitted to the Council
by the Reporter did not hold the radio station operator liable
unless he fails to prove that he neither knew or should have
known of the defamatory character of the proposed broadcast.
After discussion, however, the majority of the Council voted that
the Institute should tentatively take the view that station licensees
are subject to absolute liability for the defamatory statements of
those broadcasting to the same extent as the proprietors of news-
papers for their publication of defamatory articles or other matter
in their papers. Sorenson v. Wood, supra, was the only case cited
by the Council to support this tentative view. When the tentative
draft was submitted to the members of the Institute at Washing-
ton in May, 1935, the comment was made to the members that pro-
prietors of radio broadcasting stations who operate their facilities
to disseminate matter to the public are publishers of the matter
broadcast, and therefore, under the rule stated in § 1023, Clause
A and § 1024 of the of the Restatement,7 "they are not relieved
from liability if the matter broadcast is defamatory although they
did not intend the matter so published to be understood as defama-
tory and neither knew, nor by the exercise of every possible pre-
caution could have known, that it could be so understood." A
majority of the members present at this meeting voted, however,
to deal with the liability of broadcasting companies in a Caveat,
as follows: "The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether the
proprietors of a radio broadcasting station are relieved from lia-
bility for a defamatory broadcast by a person not in their employ
if they have used reasonable care to ascertain the character thereof
or whether, as an original publisher, they are liable irrespective
of the precautions taken to prevent the defamatory publication."
This action was taken by a vote of 17 to 14. Because of the small
number of members present and voting, the matter was given
further consideration at the annual meeting held in May, 1937.
At this meeting the final action taken was to limit the analogy of
the newspaper publisher's liability in the case of a broadcaster,
to the case in which through the submission of a manuscript or
'RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (Tent. Draft) § 1023. Intention. Except as stated
in § 1024, one who publishes defamatory matter of another is not
relieved from liability because
(a) he did not intend the matter so published to be understood
as defamatory and neither knew nor by the exercise of every possible
precaution could have known that it could be so understood.
"Id., § 1024. Circulation of Libel Created by Third Person: One who
disseminates matter defamatory of another which was originally pub-
lished by a third person is liable as though the dissemination were an
original publication by him unless he neither knows or should know of
its defamatory character.
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otherwise the broadcaster had knowledge or means of knowledge
that the matter included was actually going to be distributed over
his system. As to defamatory matter interpolated by a broad-
caster, a Caveat was voted that as to interpolated matter, the In-
stitute takes no position. Whether radio broadcasting constitutes
libel or slander was covered by § 1010, Comment f: "A libel may
be published by broadcasting over the air by means of the radio,
if the speaker reads from a prepared manuscript or speaks from
written or printed notes or memoranda. Whether an extemporane-
ous broadcast is a libel or a slander depends upon the factors stated
in sub-section 3.'8
It is manifest that the Institute, because of the paucity of legal
decisions on the subject, and the conflicting views of its members,
found it difficult to agree not only on whether defamation by
radio constitutes slander or libel, but also on the more important
question of the broadcasting station's liability.
As to whether a defamatory utterance by radio should be classi-
fied as slander or libel, it is difficult to understand why a distinc-
tion should be made between an utterance read from written
script and one which is wholly extemporaneous. The damage is
precisely the same in both cases. To designate one "libel" and
the other "slander" would seem to be carrying fine-spun distinc-
tions too far. A radio listener cannot possibly know whether what
he hears is read or impromptu. A victim should not be required
to rest his case upon coincidence, particularly in view of the fact
that it is frequently impossible for a plaintiff to prove whether
the statement was made with or without written notes. It should
be determined definitely that defamation uttered over the radio is
either libel or slander. The three cases referred to above all assume
that such an utterance constitutes libel, and in view of the serious
and extensive damage that may result because of the wide dissem-
ination, and the fact that broadcast defamation has all the effects
of a printed libel, such a view is supported by considerations of
sense and reason. "It is simple of formulation, certain of applica-
'Id., § 1010. Libel and Slander Distinguished.
(1) Libel consists of the publication of defamatory matter by written
or printed words, by its embodiment in physical form, or by any other
form of communication which has the potentially harmful qualities char-
acteristic of written or printed words.
(2) Slander consists of the publication of defamatory matter by
spoken words, transitory gestures, or by any form of communication other
than those stated in Subsection (1).
(3) The area of dissemination, the deliberate and premeditated char-
acter of its publication, and the persistence of the defamatory conduct
are factors to be considered in determining whether a publication is a
libel rather than a slander.
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tion, and undiscriminating in its remedial effectiveness.' '9
Passing to the more important question of the measure of lia-
bility, the proponents of absolute liability assure that radio broad-
casting is sufficiently similar to newspaper publication as to re-
quire the same rule. Newspapers print defamatory words on paper,
the broadcasting station impresses the message by means of sound
waves on the electrical carrier wave; the newspaper sets up the
type and operates the machinery which produces the publication,
the station arranges the microphone and adjusts the modulation
of the sound wave to the carrier wave. Newspaper copy is edited,
and the station licensee can and should revise all continuity broad-
cast. The, newspaper sells space, the licensee sells broadcasting
time. They are competitors in the advertising field and it would
be unfair to discriminate in favor of radio stations.
These comparisons, while superficially convincing, overlook one
important danger to which a radio station is subjected and the
newspaper publisher is not. The newspaper can at all times edit
its copy. While this is sometimes difficult because of the pressure
of the time element, there is at least an opportunity on the part of
the newspaper publisher to see and read what is finally printed.
A broadcasting station, on the other hand, even though it requires
a manuscript to be submitted in advance of the broadcast, is help-
less to prevent a departure from the manuscript; in public event
broadcasts the speaker frequently departs from his notes or his
speech may be wholly extemporaneous. In these cases the broad-
casting station has no opportunity to edit the manuscript.
It has been contended that the speaker can be cut off the air if
he makes a defamatory utterance, but as a practical matter, this is
next to impossible. In the first place, he has made the statement
and the damage has been done before any warning has been given
to those in charge of the controls. In cases where the speaker has
leased the facilities for a definite length of time, he is entitled
to uninterrupted use of the facilities unless he indulges in obscene
or profane language.10 If lawyers trained in the subject, have
difficulty in determining what constitutes a defamatory statement,
consider the difficulties of the radio station employee at the con-
trols in determining whether what the speaker is saying consti-
tutes "spoken words tending to lower a man in the estimation
of right thinking men". While a station may have exercised every
0Radio Defamation, George R. Farnum, XVI BOSTON UNIvEBsrrY LAW
REVIEW, January, 1936.
1°The Federal Communications Commission under § 303, Subsection m,
Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1083, is authorized to suspend the
license of any operator upon proof that the licensee has transmitted
radio communications containing profane or obscene words or language.
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precaution in examining the manuscript of a prepared speech, the
speaker may in the enthusiasm of the moment, or with deliberate
intention, depart from his notes and make a libelous statement
before he can be taken from the air. Certain speeches are broad-
cast where no advance copy can be furnished. Under these condi-
tions, liability without fault would appear to be imposing upon the
radio station a burden entirely too onerous.11
Liability of a telegraph company is limited to the transmission
of defamatory matter which is libelous on its face and is trans-
mitted because the carrier failed to exercise due care.12 A news
vendor or the proprietor of a circulating library is liable only if
he fails to exercise due care in publishing or disseminating the
defamatory matter.13
The solution of the problem of liability calls for a balancing of
certain definite considerations. In the first place, radio broad-
casting is concerned with the public interest. If it is to be ham-
strung by fine spun, stringent distinctions, it is entirely conceiv-
able that abuses by those in power that call for correction by an
enlightened public, such as corruption in politics and misuse of
power by irresponsible labor leaders will thrive on the silence
which the rule of absolute liability must perforce impose upon the
operators of radio stations. A fair estimate of the harm likely
to result to the victims of defamatory statements must also be
given, and a balancing of these conflicting interests should finally
result in a clear but just rule which will be consistent with fair-
ness to the individual and with the promotion of the interests
of the public.
The Sorenson, Wasrner and Coffey cases recognize the rule of
absolute liability. It is apparent, however, that the Wasmer and
Coffey cases relied upon the pioneer announcement to that effect
contained in the Sorenson case. It, in turn, was influenced by
the apparent analogy between radio and newspaper publishing.
Radio is a new art and its possibilities for future growth and
public service are unlimited. Liability without fault today is the
exception rather than the rule. Such strict liability is the out-
growth and survival from situations which have no counterpart
"The American Bar Association has questioned the wisdom of impos-
ing absolute liability. Report of Committee on Communications, 57 A.
B. A. 445, 58 A. B. A. 364, Advance Program 1935 A. D. A. 127, 128.
"Nye v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 104 Fed. 628 (C. C. A. 1900);
Peterson v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 72 Minn. 41, 74 N. W. 1022
(1898); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Cashman, 149 Fed. 367 (C. C.
A. 1906). See also 20 COL. L. REV. 30, at p. 369.
OStreet v. Johnson, 80 Wis. 455, 50 N. W. 395 (1891); Emmons v. Pot-
tle, 16 LAW REP. Q. B. D. 354 (1885), Vizetelly v. Mudies Select Library,
2 Q. B. 170 (1900).
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today. If a radio station operator cannot control the speaker or
the instrumentality over which the speaker disseminates the de-
famatory imputation, it is difficult to uphold the application of
the absolute liability rule. The Restatement of Torts offers little
of value in the final solution of this question. In fact, introduc-
ing the distinction between statements made from written notes
and those made extemporaneously, simply complicates and does
not answer the question.
The rule of due care, if ultimately adopted, would necessarily
require the application of the rules of negligence to each case
according to the facts and circumstances. Whether a copy of the
manuscript was required in advance, whether the character of the
speaker is such that the broadcast station could anticipate inflam-
matory and violent utterances, whether the employee handling the
monitor controls had been instructed to cut off the speaker in
case of defamatory utterances, the opportunity for prevention
of the utterance complained of, and the grounds for anticipation
of such utterances, are examples of the line of inquiry which it
may be assumed the courts would take in determining whether
the broadcasting station was negligent.
If the rule of absolute liability governs radio broadcasting, it
has been suggested that the licensee may protect himself by pro-
curing an indemnity agreement from the speaker. This, however,
would be only as strong as the speaker's financial resources, and
in the ordinary situation offers no or little protection. Insurance
against defamation is unobtainable. The final choice, therefore,
that faces the licensee is to broadcast or not to broadcast, any pro-
grams where there is the slightest possibility of defamatory utter-
ances.
It has been suggested that radio station which exist by Congres-
sional sufferance should likewise be governed by an act of Con-
gress pertaining to defamation.1 4 Assuming the constitutionality
of such legislation, this suggestion has the merit of uniformity,
and if such a Bill could be drafted to meet the exigencies of broad-
casting, it would benefit not only radio but the general public
and provide for them a yardstick which would eliminate the liti-
gation and the constant threat of litigation growing out of radio
broadcasting utterances.
The State of Iowa has recently enacted a statute as follows:
"Section 1. The owner, lessee, licensee, or operator of
a radio broadcasting station, and the agents or employees
of any such owner, lessee, licensee or operator, shall not
'See Federal CaontroZ of Defamation by Radio, Jos. E. Keller, XII
NOTUE DAmE LAwYER 14-39, 134-78, Nov. and Jan. 1936-1937.
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be liable for any damages for any defamatory statement
published or uttered in or as a part of a radio broadcast,
by one other than such owner, lessee, licensee or operator,
or agent or employee thereof, if such owner, lessee, li-
censee, operator, agent or employee, shall prove the exer-
cise of due care to prevent the publication or utterance
of such statement in such broadcast."
The State of Washington, in 1935, amended its Criminal Libel
Law to include radio broadcasting. 5 Apparently, however, this
leaves open the question whether in a civil suit for damages the
same rules would apply."'
A warning note and qualification of the views expressed in
this article should be made. Any abuse of privilege by a station
licensee cannot be countenanced where there has been a clear and
manifest failure to consider the public interest and the adverse
affect upon it in certain types of radio broadcasting. 7 Scandalous
matter should never be accepted, nor should a radio station oper-
"
5Session Laws of 1935, p. 329:
"Section 1. That section 2424 Remington's Revised Statutes be and
the same is hereby amended to read as follows:
"2424. Every malicious publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy,
sign radio broadcasting or which shall in any other manner transmit
the human voice or reproduce the same from records or other appliances
or means, which shall tend:
"(1) To expose any living person to hatred, contempt, ridicule or
obloquy, or to deprive him of the benefit of public confidence or social
intercourse; or
"(2) To expose the memory of one deceased to hatred, contempt,
ridicule or obloquy; or
"(3) To injure any person, corporation or association of persons in
his or their business or occupation, shall be libel. Every person who pub-
lishes a libel shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
"Section 2. That section 2427 Remington's Revised Statutes be and
the same is hereby amended to read as follows:
"2427. Every editor or proprietor of a book, newspaper or serial, and
every manager of a copartnership or corporation by which any book,
newspaper or serial, and every ow-ner, operator, proprietor or person
exercising control over any broadcasting station or reproducing record
of human voice or who broadcasts over the radio or reproduces the
human voice or aids or abets either directly or indirectly in such broad-
cast or reproduction shall be chargeable with the publication of any
matter so disseminated; Provided, That in any prosecution or action for
libel it shall be an absolute defense if the defendant shows that the
matter complained of was published without his knowledge or fault and
against his wishes by another who had no authority from him to make
such publication and was promptly retracted by the defendant with an
equal degree of publicity upon written request of the complainant."
See also, CAL. PENAL CODE (Deering, 1931) § 258; ILL. REV. STAT.(1935) c. 38, § 567(1); N. D. LAWS (1929) c. 117; Oi.:. LAWS (1931) c.
366.
"See Enright v. Bringold, 106 Wash. 233, 179 Pac. 844 (1919).
"That broadcasters are mindful of their responsibility is indicated
from the following language contained in the Code of Ethics of the Na-
tional Association of Broadcasters, adopted March 25, 1929:
"Care should be taken to prevent the broadcasting of statements
derogatory to other stations, to individuals, or to competing products or
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ator permit the use of his facilities to those who have exhibited
intemperate and reckless habits in the expression of their views
and comments on individuals. As was stated in Trinity Methodist
Church South v. Federal Radio Commission, 62 Fed. (2d) 850:
"If it be considered that one in possession of a permit
to broadcast in interstate commerce may, without let or
hindrance from any source, use these facilities, reaching
out, as they do, from one corner of the country to the
other, to obstruct the administration of justice, offend the
religious susceptibilities of thousands, inspire political
distrust and civic discord, or offend youth and innocence
by the free use of words suggestive of sexual immorality,
and be answerable for slander only at the instance of the
one offended, then this great science, instead of a boon,
will become a scourge, and the nation a theatre for the
display of individual passions and the collision of per-
sonal interests . . .Appellant . .. may not, as we think,
demand, of right, the continued use of an instrumentality
of commerce for such purposes."
Some of the comments made in this article grow out of actual
questions that have arisen in connection with the writer's prac-
tice. The opinions expressed may possibly have been influenced
by the complexity of the station operator's problem and the
practical impossibility of guarding against liability if the rule
of absolute liability is applied. Without minimizing the rights
of individuals to live in peace, secure against the invasion of
their private rights and reputations, it is submitted that indi-
vidual protection is amply safeguarded by the application of the
due care test, and that the social aspects of radio broadcasting
with its opportunity for the exposure of public evils, calls for a
more liberal rule of liability than the adjudicated cases so far have
laid down.
services except where the law specifically provides that the station has
no right of censorship."
It should be noted that Sorenson v. Wood, supra, specifically holds
that the prohibition of the Radio Act against censorship of political
speeches extends only to the "political and partisan trend"; it would
seem clear that a defamatory utterance in a political speech could be
censored.
